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Abstract 
The current international monetary system (IMS) is fragile because the dollar standard is rapidly 
deteriorating. The dual role the dollar as the dominant international money and national money 
cannot be easily reconciled because the US monetary authorities face a conflict between 
pursuing domestic objectives of employment and  inflation  and maintaining the international 
public good of a stable money. To strengthen the IMS, China has advocated  the revitalization of the 
Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). But SDRs are neither money nor a claim on any international 
institution; are issued exogenously without any consideration to countries’ financing needs; and 
can activate international monies only though bilateral transactions. The historical record of 
SDRs as international reserves is altogether unimpressive. We propose instead the creation of a 
supernational bank money (SBM) within the institutional setting of a clearing union. This union 
would be a full-fledged agreement  by participating central banks on specific rules of the game, 
such as size and duration of overdrafts, designation of countries that would have to bear the 
burden of external adjustment, and  coordination of monetary policies objectives and at expense 
of the maintenance of the international public good. We also discuss structural changes that 
would make SDRs converge to SBMs.  
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The ongoing financial crisis has underscored the inherent fragility of the international 
financial system and of its regulatory structure. Originated in the United States, the country that 
enjoys the most advanced financial markets and is also at the center of the international monetary 
system (IMS), the crisis was preceded by a bubble in the housing and share markets fuelled by an 
expansive monetary policy; see Fratianni (2008). By now, a consensus has developed that the 
financial regulatory structure needs a significant overhaul. Much less attention has instead 
received the instability of  the  dollar-based IMS and the potential that it may have in sparking 
another deep crisis in the future. The fact that the financial tsunami has not instigated  a 
confidence crisis in the US dollar has fed optimism that the financial crisis may be resolved 
without substantive changes in the existing international monetary regime. In this vein, at the 
onset of the crisis, Bernanke (2007)  re-affirmed the thesis that the external imbalances of the 
United States were largely caused by factors taking place outside the United States, namely in 
fast growing emerging economies (in particular China) and oil-producing countries where  ex-
ante saving was far in excess of ex-ante investment. The implication of the global saving glut 
thesis is that the large US external imbalances are largely a  temporary phenomenon, rather than 
structural, and thus would find a natural solution in time. Another implication of the Bernanke 
thesis is that the onus of the adjustment problem falls on the periphery rather than on the center 
country of the dollar-based IMS.  
The global saving glut hypothesis diverts attention from the long-term deterioration of  
the dollar standard. The external deficits of the United States, with the attendant dramatic rise in 
its net foreign indebtedness,  are long dated and result from a fundamental weakness of an IMS  
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where a single national money functions also as an international money, a point that was first 
identified by Robert Triffin (1960) in the context of the gold-dollar exchange standard. 
With this premise, the paper argues that the current IMS is fragile because the dollar 
standard is deteriorating. The dollar remains at the top of the money pyramid because none of the 
competing international monies, and especially the euro, is ready yet to fully replace the dollar. 
This scenario is reminiscent of what took place in  the inter-war period when sterling was today’s 
dollar and the dollar was an emerging international money. The long transition from one leading 
international money to another did not serve us well: it instigated a dark age of  protectionism 
and contributed to the severity of the Great Depression; see Kindleberger (1973). Like the dollar, 
the French franc and the German mark in the Thirties, today’s euro and currencies of large 
creditor countries (such as China’s yuan) are not ready to take up the money leadership. This 
historical parallel should give policy makers sufficient incentives to shore up quickly the IMS. 
Changes have to be fundamental. To begin with, we must recognize that money and finance are 
closely intertwined; it is wishful to think that IMS robustness will come by concentrating 
exclusively in “fixing” the financial system.  The IMS itself needs to be fixed and the best time 
for doing it is now for the simple reason that radical changes in the rules of the game are effected 
in times of crises. 
Our preferred solution is the creation of a supernational bank money (SBM), which 
would coexist along side with international monies. We take inspiration from the principles 
underlying Keynes’ old plan for bancor and an international clearing union; see Alessandrini and 
Fratianni (2009). These principles tend to resurface in times of stress. Recently,  Zhou 
Xiaochuan (2009), the governor of the People’s Bank of China, has made the case for a 
restructuring of the IMS around a supernational money, but  for practical reasons has then opted  
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for  the revitalization of the Special Drawing Rights (SDR). This has found a  policy echo in the 
recommendation of the G20 leaders, at the London April, 2009 meeting,  to produce a fresh 
allocation of $250 billion of SDRs. We argue that dropping more SDRs from a helicopter, 
without changing the essential characteristics of SDRs, is not a long-term solution. SDRs suffer 
from two fundamental drawbacks: they are neither money nor a claim on any international 
institution. The historical record indicates that the SDRs have failed in their intended role as 
supplement to international reserves. Significant structural changes have to be introduced to 
make the SDRs work.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents a few historical facts about 
international monies; we emphasize that the money structure tends to be more hierarchical than 
hegemonic and that the transition period from one dominant money to another is long. Section 
III  keys on the fundamental weakness of an international money that is also a national money; 
there we present data on the long-term deterioration of the dollar standard and raise the issue of 
how long can the United States continue to borrow foreign capital without paying a sovereign-
risk premium. Section IV details the limitations of the SDR scheme. Section V elaborates on our 
SBM plan.  Conclusions are drawn in Section VI. 
 
II. International monies 
   The historical evidence indicates that one currency tends to dominate others both as an 
international medium of exchange and as a store of value. In the 19
th century, Britain was the 
leading industrial economy in the world and its currency, the British pound, the leading but not  
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the exclusive international money in the world.
1 The IMS was more hierarchical than hegemonic 
(Fratianni and Hauskrecht 1998). Britain was at the top the pyramid in the international gold 
standard. Interest rate changes initiated in the periphery prompted a smaller reaction in British 
interest rates than in the interest rates of  the two countries that immediately followed Britain  in 
the hierarchy, France and Germany (Lindert 1969, pp. 49-52).
2  
World War I marked the end of Britain’s economic and financial leadership; yet, the key 
status of the pound lasted  for more than four more decades (Eichengreen 2005).  The inter-war 
period left a vacuum in both currency and trade (Kindleberger 1973).The Bretton Woods 
Agreement of 1944 sanctified the preeminence of the US dollar. The  Agreement broke down in 
1973, but in practice as early as 1968 (when the German Bundesbank decided to revalue the 
                                                 
1 Further back in history, the Roman silver denarius was the first world currency; the Byzantine solidus 
was the unchallenged coin from the 5th to the 7th century; Roberto Lopez (1951) calls it the dollar of the 
Middle Ages. But the international role of the solidus was challenged by the Islamic dinar which 
eventually made the cross over; both lasted until the 12
th century. In the 13
th century, the Italian coins 
came to prominence: the Genoese genoino,  the Florentine fiorino, and the Venetian ducato. All three 
coins circulated side by side  for quite some time and shared three attributes: large weight (high unitary 
value), high intrinsic (purchasing power) stability and a leading position in international commerce of the 
issuer; see Cipolla (1956). 
2  For more evidence on the  center vs. periphery of the international gold standard, see 
Eichengreen (1985) and Flandreau et al. (1998). The pyramidal structure is also corroborated by  
reserve currency shares data on foreign holdings of major currencies (Lindert 1969, Tables 2 and 
3). In 1899, foreign-exchange assets at official institutions denominated in pounds represented 63 
percent of the total, those denominated in French francs 16 percent, and those denominated in 
marks 15 percent. These shares were computed by subtracting the “unallocated” item from the total in 
“official institutions” from Lindert’s Table 3. In 1913, the reserve currency shares in pounds, francs 
and marks had become, respectively, 48  percent, 31 percent and 15 percent. Quoting from 
Lindert (1969, p. 25): 
“One trend revealed by these benchmark data is the relative rise of France and Germany 
as reserve centers. London was easily the chief repository for official funds at the turn of 
the century…The subsequent competition among centers implied by the available 
statistics was more real in the case of Anglo-German competition than Anglo-French. 
The lion’s share of French liabilities to foreign central banks and governments after the 
turn of the century was taken by the official franc balances of Russia alone, while the use 




Deutsche mark relative to the dollar), because the United States “abused” the privileges 
emanating from its national currency functioning also as the key international currency.  
The creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999 consolidated 11 separate 
currencies  of industrialized countries into a brand new currency, the euro. It was a big event 
that, on balance, was greeted more with optimism than pessimism about  the prospects of the 
euro to challenge the dollar in the market place  for international monies.
3  Ten years later, the 
performance of the euro as an international money has not disappointed the euro enthusiasts.  
The ascendancy of the euro as an “international store of value” coincides with the increased 
degree of efficiency, liquidity and integration of the euro financial markets. 
Following the depreciation of the dollar relative to the euro starting in 2002, increasing 
attention has been given to the prospect that central banks, especially those in Asia, may want to 
substantially diversify their holdings out of dollars and into euros and, in the process, bring an 
end to the dominance of the dollar in official portfolios. Data on currency composition of foreign 
official holdings, available up to 2007,  show that the dollar retains the same reserve share that 
prevailed at the end of Bretton Woods; see Table 1. The novel aspect in the data is that the euro 
has gained at the expense of currencies other than the dollar: the euro share in official reserves 
has gone from 6.7% of the combined shares of the legacy currencies mark, franc, and guilder in 
1973 to 26.5% in 2007. The euro has become an alternative to the dollar  to the point that we 
may characterize the present system as the beginning of a bipolar  international money system; 
see  Fratianni and Hauskrecht  (1998).
                                                 
3 Among euro enthusiasts, we mention, among others, Bergsten (1997),  Alogoskoufis and Portes 
(1997), and Portes and Rey (1998); among euro pessimists, the clearest argument was  made by Feldstein  
(1997) ; on this, see Fratianni et al. (1998). See also Papaioannou and Portes (2008) on the costs and 







Table 1: Shares of national currencies in foreign official reserves 
(percent) 
               
                
Year US$ Deutsche 
mark 









1965  56.1  0.1  0  20  0.9  0  0  Na 
1973  64.5  5.5  0.1  4.2  0.7  1.1 0.5 Na 
1977  79.2  9.3  2.2  1.6  1.1  1.9 0.7 Na 
1982 57.9  11.6  4.1  1.8  1  2.3  1  Na 
1987  53.9  13.8  6.8  1.9  0.9  1.7 1.2 Na 
1992  48.9  14  7.4  2.6  2.6  0.8 0.7 Na 
1997  59.1  13.7  5.1  3.3  1.5  0.5 0.5 Na 
2003  65.9  Na  3.9  2.8  Na  0.2  Na  25.2 
2004  65.9  Na  3.8  3.4  Na  0.2  Na  24.8 
2005  66.9  Na  3.6  3.6  Na  0.1  Na  24.1 
2006  65.5  Na  3.1  4.4  Na  0.2  Na  25.1 
2007  63.9  Na  2.9  4.7  Na  0.2  Na  26.5 
 
 
Source: Chinn and Frankel (2005, Table 1) for data up to 1997 and IMF, 2008 Annual 
Report for the period 2003-2007. 
 
The status of international monies is rapidly evolving and the end point will be 
determined by future and thus uncertain policy actions. To see this point,  we recall that, other 
things the same, there is a positive correlation between the relative economic size of the country 
and its international-currency status. The decline in the dollar share of world reserves after 
World War II occurred as the U.S. share of world output was falling (Eichengreen and Frankel 
1996). Relative economic size may proxy for the relative transaction domain of the currency; as 
this shrinks so does the network value of that currency. On this score, the formation of EMU 
gave the euro a big push in competing against the dollar for the position of dominant currency. 
On the other hand, the euro had to overcome the serious handicap that it was issued by a new and  
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untested central bank, the European Central Bank (ECB),  representing a group of countries that 
had yet to achieve political unification. While the ECB is now a tested institution that has earned 
a considerable amount of reputation as inflation fighter, political unification in the EMU is not 
on the horizon. Without political unification, the euro project will remain incomplete and so will 
the challenge of the euro to the preeminence of the dollar.  
In sum, the dollar remains the leading international currency, but with the ascent of the 
euro the system is becoming increasingly bipolar. As we will argue in Section V,  a bipolar 
structure world could be exploited to create a supernational money, based on the foundations of 
the two international monies and a clearing mechanism.  
 
III.  The long-term deterioration of the dollar standard 
 
The inherent flaw in using an international money that is also a national money is that the 
issuing country faces a conflict between pursuing domestic objectives of employment and   
inflation  and maintaining the international public good of a stable money. There are 
circumstances in which the twin objectives cannot be reconciled simultaneously and a choice 
must be made as to which objective dominates. In the post World War II era -- with complete 
suffrage and a political system more reactive to pressure groups—conflicts between domestic 
and external objectives tend to be resolved in favor of the former, except when the external 
constraint is really binding. This has been particularly true for the United States,  which has 
enjoyed a soft external constraint. The costs of  being a reserve currency country were perceived 
to be too large relative to the benefits; the United States generated an inflation rate that was 
neither consistent with the fixed dollar-gold conversion price nor with the preferences of major 
players like Germany.  
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The dollar standard has been deteriorating over the last three decades as a result of the US 
economy systematically spending beyond its domestic output and becoming, in the process, the 
largest net debtor in the world. Table 2 presents data on the US current account balance –which 
captures the difference of the excess of domestic absorption over domestic output- from 1973 to 
2007, both in billions of dollars and as a percent of US GDP. To emphasize trends, we consider 
periods of at least five years. From the end of Bretton Woods to 2007, the US has accumulated 
deficits of $ 6,665 billion at an average yearly rate of  2.1 percent of US GDP. More importantly, 
external deficits have been rising over time:  from virtual balance of the Seventies to yearly 
deficits averaging 1.8 of GDP in the Eighties, 1.9 percent of GDP in the Nineties, and 5.1 percent 
of GDP in the most recent period of 2001-2007.   
Table 2: US current account balance, 1973 -2007 
Period Cumulative  surplus 
(+) or deficits (-), 
billions of dollars 
As a percent of 
US GDP, 
annual average 
1973-1980                  4.1   0.1 
1981-1985 -251.7  -1.3 
1986-1990 -607.4  -2.4 
1991-1995 -367.2  -1.1 
1996-2000 -1,199.6  -2.7 
2001-2007 -4.242.7  -5.1 
1973-2007 -6,664.5  -2.1 
Source: For the US current account balance, Economic Report of the President: 2009 Report Spreadsheet 
Tables;  for  US GDP, FRED data base, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
Table 3 shows data in the net international investment position of the United States, with 
direct investment measured at current cost. Net foreign debt at the end of 2007 was $2,442  
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billion.  Over the 21
st century this debt has increased by $1,111 billion, far less than the 
cumulative current-account deficits of $4,243 billion. The reason for this remarkable discrepancy 
between the sum of deficit flows and changes in net foreign debt  is due to  the  international role 
of the dollar, which permits the United States, not only to earn foreign seigniorage, but to act  as 
the “banker of the world” in the language of Despres, Kindleberger, and Salant (1966).  That is, 
the United States borrows short at relative low rates of interest and lends long at high rates of 
return. The banker-to-the-world analogy can be extended into a modern leveraged-financial-
intermediary view, as in Gourinchas and Rey (2005). Under this scenario, the United States is 
issuing not only short-term liabilities but also fixed-income liabilities that are leveraged to effect 
investments abroad in the form of illiquid, but with high capital gain potential, foreign direct 
investments and equities. The excess rates of return on U.S. assets over U.S. liabilities captures 
the “exorbitant privilege” the United States earns because of its special role in the international 
monetary system.   
  The data of Table 3 are consistent with the “exorbitant privilege” thesis of the dollar. 
Over the period 2001-2007, the United States enjoyed an excess of foreign price appreciation on 
its foreign assets over price appreciation on foreign holdings of US assets valued at $ 1,263 
billion; an exchange rate adjustment, due to the depreciation of the dollar relative to the foreign 
currencies that denominate US foreign assets, worth $950 billion; and higher valuation, due to 
changes in coverage and capital gains on direct investment affiliates, valued at $ 956 billion. The 
end result is that the increase in net foreign debt, over the 2001-2007 period, was approximately 





Table 3: Components of Changes in the Net International Investment 
Position  
  With Direct Investment at Current Cost, 1989-2007   
  [Millions of dollars]   
Year  Position 
Beginning 
















(a) (b) (c) (d)  (a+b+c+d) 
1989 -160,865 -47,394 -38,017 -5,747 12,230 -78,928 -239,793
1990 -239,793 -58,123 -26,636 43,845 57,302 16,388 -223,405
1991 -223,405 -43,833 -63,179 4,272 41,399 -61,341 -284,746
1992 -284,746 -93,939 -39,673 -54,691 68,765 -119,538 -404,284
1993 -404,284 -79,208  109,707 -14,462 110,517 126,554 -277,730
1994 -277,730  -124,237  39,636 45,741 25,285 -13,575 -291,305
1995 -291,305 -82,838 -93,308 17,221 27,319 -131,606 -422,911
1996 -422,911  -134,476  47,359 -42,287 96,022 -33,382 -456,293
1997 -456,293  -218,977 -44,200 -140,151 80,058 -323,270 -779,563
1998 -779,563 -66,965  -148,130 31,100 112,094 -71,901 -851,464
1999 -851,464  -238,148  220,818 -36,392 180,843 127,121 -724,343
2000 -724,343  -477,701  12,299 -199,581 58,696 -606,287 -1,330,630
2001 -1,330,630  -400,254  -116,115 -111,724 89,848 -538,245 -1,868,875
2002 -1,868,875  -500,515  -62,273 148,321 245,372 -169,095 -2,037,970
2003 -2,037,970  -532,879  8,613 275,116 200,607 -48,543 -2,086,513
2004 -2,086,513  -532,331  94,578 197,843 81,006 -158,904 -2,245,417
2005 -2,245,417  -700,716  720,816 -220,947 521,118 320,271 -1,925,146
2006 -1,925,146  -839,074  419,978 222,368 -103,930 -300,658 -2,225,804
2007 -2,225,804  -774,345  197,683 438,711 -78,074 -216,025 -2,441,829
 





The “exorbitant privilege” extracted by the United States because of the special   role of 
the dollar translates into a soft external constraint. Unlike any other country in the world, the 
United States can finance a significant amount of its imports of goods and services plus income 
payments through increases of low-interest rate liquid liabilities (primarily short-term US 
government securities and deposits with U.S. banks) held by foreign monetary authorities. For 
almost half a century, foreign central banks financing has accounted, on average, for 
approximately 6.5 per cent of total US imports, but have been higher when the dollar has been 
weak against major currencies and lower when the dollar has been strong; see  Alessandrini and 
Fratianni (2009, Figure 1). Central bank financing ratios rose up to 40 per cent in the first half of 
the seventies in concomitance with the end of Bretton Woods and the first oil shock; declined to 
less than one per cent as the dollar experienced a sizeable appreciation in the first half of the 
eighties; rose again with the depreciation of the dollar after 1985; and  settled to an average of 4 
per cent in the nineties. Over the recent 2001-2008 period, the financing ratios have rise again to 
an average in excess of 12 percent of total imports, peaking at 19 percent in 2004; see Figure 1. 
In absolute numbers, over the eight-year span the stock of central bank financing rose by $ 2,399 
billion, according to US balance of payments statistics. 




Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, International Economic Accounts, 
http://www.bea.gov/international/ 
 
These trends reflect the propensity of many emerging economies, especially in Asia, and 
oil-producing countries to set undervalued exchange rates with respect to the dollar and to 
accumulate foreign reserves; see Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber (2003) and Alessandrini 
and Fratianni (2009). This propensity, as we have seen, has risen since the start of the new 
millennium and has financed a growing share of US current-account deficits. International 
reserves have been growing  at an average annual rate of 11 per cent over the period from 1995 
to mid 2007, with a sharp acceleration taking place since 2003 when China began increasing  
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sharply its stock of international reserves.
4 China alone holds 15 per cent of US Treasuries and is 
concerned about its undiversified position. Russia, with the third largest stock of international 
reserves, has instead diversified significantly away from the dollar.
5 On the other hand, the US 
government is relying increasingly on foreign official agencies to fund its current and 
prospective budget requirements.
6  
  In sum, foreign ownership of the US government debt, especially in the hands of  few 
central banks  raises the risk of a precipitous fall in the value of the dollar following a re-
adjustment in the currency composition of international reserves. The critical question asked in 
the market is: How long can the United States continue to borrow foreign capital at existing rates 
without incurring in a sovereign-risk crisis?  
The relative indifference of US policy makers towards balance-of-payments deficits and, 
later, about the value of the dollar in relation to other important currencies became known as  
“benign neglect.” A resurgence of this policy  has occurred in the middle of this decade and is 
known as the saving glut hypothesis; see Bernanke (2005). According to this view, an exogenous 
upward shift of the saving functions in fast-growing Asian and oil-producing economies, 
unmatched by a comparable shift in their investment functions, was the cause of the large US 
                                                 
4 At the end of 2002, Chinese reserves were $ 286 billion; two years later they more than doubled 
to $610 billion; two years later they almost doubled again to $1066 billion; in 2009 they exceed $ 2,000 
billion,  75 percent of which dollar denominated; see China’s Foreign Assets, Center for Geoeconomic 
Studies, http://blogs.cfr.org/geographics/2009/05/15/china%E2%80%99s-foreign-assets/.  
 
5 The Moscow Times of May 19, 20009 reports that the euro share of Russia’s foreign reserves, at the end 
of 2008, was 47.5 percent against the 41.5 share of the dollar; see. 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/600/42/377235.htm. 
6 In the 2001-2007 period, foreign official holdings of US government securities rose by $ 1,746 billion, 
an amount that is about 50 percent higher than the increase in net foreign debt. In 2008, central banks and 
sovereign funds purchased close to $600 billion of Treasuries (see Brad Setser’s “Who bought all the 
Treasuries the US issued in 2008? And who will be the big buyers in 2009?,”  
http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2009/). The  2009 fiscal stimulus of  about $ 800 billion will add further 




capital inflows since the middle of the nineties.   The resulting ex-ante gap between saving and 
investment is responsible for current-account surpluses in emerging countries and falling real 
rates of interest in the world. According to the saving glut hypothesis, the industrial world, but 
primarily the United States, had to absorb the capital inflows generated by Asia and oil-
producing countries. Once the shock peters out, current-account imbalances will be reduced. As 
we have already indicated in the introduction, the implication of the Bernanke thesis is that the 
onus of the adjustment problem falls on the periphery rather than on the center country of the 
dollar-based IMS; in others words, the appropriate US policy is benign neglect. 
In sum, a national money that becomes an international money cannot serve two masters 
equally well. In the tug of  war between domestic and international objectives, political 
economy considerations dictate that domestic goals of employment and inflation tend to win at 
the expense of the  maintenance of the international public good. It follows that an effective 
reform of the international monetary must resolve the dual role of domestic/international money. 
At the moment, policy makers are betting on resuscitating the SDRs, the theme  of the next 
section. 
 
IV. THE SPECIAL DRAWING RIGHTS 
SDRs were created by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1969 to supplement the 
stock of official reserves. The original intent of the program was to revitalize the dying Bretton 
Woods system by altering the composition of international reserves between the scarce quantity 
of monetary  gold and the abundant stock of dollar liabilities. The initial allocation of SDR 9.3 
billion, over the  1970-72  period, failed to achieve this objective. Not surprisingly, in 1971 the 
gold convertibility of the dollar was suspended. A second allocation of SDR 21.4 billion took  
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place from 1979 tom 1981 in the wake of the second oil shock. Also this allocation failed to 
achieve the intended results of stabilizing the dollar-based IMS. After that, SDRs have played a 
marginal role as international reserve, in parallel with the declining importance of the IMF. The 
SDR has remained mainly a unit of account, defined in terms of fixed, but adjustable every five 
years, quantities of a few important national monies. At the moment, the basket includes  the 
dollar, the euro, the yen and pound sterling. 
The  G20 recommendation of a new SDR allocation worth $ 250 billion at the 2009 
London meeting has brought back to front stage the SDR as an international reserve asset. It is 
the only official proposal to strengthen the IMS; hence,  it deserves careful examination not only 
for its own merit but also for the prospect of a positive evolution of the IMS. Policy makers have 
underscored that the new allocation can be effected rapidly because it is part of an existing 
institution codified by the  Articles of Agreement of the IMF. They have also claimed that the 
decision would  create sufficient new international liquidity to finance external imbalances and 
set the IMF again back at the center of the IMS.  In fact,  the London recommendation builds on 
a weak scheme that has produced few results in the past.
7 Furthermore, the size of the new 
allocation is small relative to the size of the external imbalances, especially those of the United 
States. Finally, the very structure of the SDRs assigns to the IMF a largely passive role.  
To better understand the discrepancy between policy makers’ expectations and likely 
outcome, we start by recalling that the “SDR is neither a currency, nor a claim on the IMF. 
Rather, it is a potential claim on the freely usable currencies of IMF members” (IMF 2009).  
Once a SDR allocation decision has been made, the IMF has no discretionary power on how 
SDRs will be used. Under the present system, exchanges of SDRs for national currencies occur 
                                                 
7 Fratianni and Savona (1974) formally demonstrated the intrinsic weakness of the SDR scheme, which 
the authors define as “a classic jump in the dark”. See also Fratianni (1974).  
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either through voluntary bilateral transactions or through the IMF that may  designate member 
countries with external surpluses to accept SDRs in exchange for their currencies. Thus, the IMF 
acts as a broker matching deficit to surplus countries to exchange SDRs for international 
monies. The transactions remain bilateral.  
Each member country receives an amount of SDRs that is proportional to its quota in the 
Fund, without any necessary ex-ante consideration about the external liquidity  of  the country. 
After the allocation, a deficit country (DC)  can  swap  SDRs  for an equivalent amount of 
international money, say dollars, at a surplus country (SC).  The price of the swap is an interest 
rate (equal to a weighted average of the money market of the four currencies in the SDR basket) 
paid by DC to SC.  After the swap, DC has more dollars and less SDRs; the opposite is true for 
SC. DC can use the acquired dollars to intervene in the exchange markets, while SC can use the 
acquired SDRs to diversify the currency composition of its international reserves.  In essence, 
the mechanics are those of a “giro system” aimed at stabilizing exchange rates (Machlup 1968, 
p. 13). 
The SDR scheme is designed to  activate hoarded international money. The latter is 
redistributed  from SC to DC countries. But there is very little that SDRs  can do to improve the 
position of the  largest deficit and net external debtor country in the world. The United States is 
unique in both the size of its external imbalances and as a provider of the dominant international 
money. The US share of the new SDR 250 billion is paltry relative to the size of the US external 
imbalance. To make a dent on the problem would require a large allocation only for the United 
States.  Under such circumstances, the Fed could exchange SDRs for dollar assets at SCs, 




8 But apart from the large size of SDRs involved, the bilateral SDR-dollar swap 
would be incapable of making the necessary adjustment required to mop up the  “excess” supply 
of dollars. The swap, in fact, would leave the size of the US monetary base unchanged (only the 
composition would change in favor of domestic assets). To effect a reduction of the US 
monetary base, the Fed would have to sell in the market place the T-bills received from SCs in 
exchange of SDRs. The Fed and the US government would have to explicitly agree to such a 
policy. 
 The basic idea of using SDRs as a replacement for dollar-denominated assets held by 
central banks was taken up in the Seventies by the Committee of Twenty (1974). The latter 
produced a proposal,  known as the Substitution Account, which was later evaluated by the 
Interim Committee of the IMF in 1978-79; see Kenen (1981) and Micossi and Saccomanni 
(1981). Under the proposal, central banks could open an account denominated in SDRs by 
depositing dollar assets at the IMF. Thus, SDRs would be created endogenously by the actions 
of those central banks that deemed to have too many dollar assets in their official reserves. In 
contrast, the existing SDR scheme envisions only exogenous supply increases. The Substitution 
Account never came to light because neither the IMF nor the United States were willing to bear 
the exchange rate risk arising from an unhedged position of the Fund having dollar assets and 
SDR liabilities (Boughton 2001, ch. 18). Had the Substitution Account been implemented, we 
would have avoided the large overhang of dollar reserves that now  threatens the durability of 
the international dollar standard. 
The importance of reforming the existing SDR mechanism in a supernational direction  
has been raised recently by Zhou Xiaochuan (2009), the Governor of the People’s Bank of 
                                                 
8 In the balance sheet of the Fed, the exchange would imply a reduction of  SDRs and an equivalent 
increase of dollar assets (T-bills).  
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China. China, more than any other country, is exposed to the risk of an implosion of the dollar 
standard and feels urgently the need to diversify out of dollar assets. Given that the yuan is not 
an international money, there is an obvious Chinese interest in seeing the transformation of the 
dollar standard into a supernational money standard. As we have mentioned it in the 
introduction, Mr. Xiaochuan has chosen to endorse the SDRs and has suggested at the same time 
a series of recommendations that would make them converge progressively to a supernational 
money. Among the recommendations, it is worth mentioning the following three: transforming 
the SDR from an artificial basket currency into one backed by assets; establishing  a settlement  
system between the SDR and national currencies so as to make the SDR a fully fledged  money; 
and linking the SDRs to a specific institution that would be responsible for their management 
and their value, in other words becoming someone’s liability.  
 
V. SUPERNATIONAL BANK MONEY 
The current, deep, financial crisis creates almost a unique opportunity for a gradual 
introduction of a supernational money aimed at reducing the asymmetries of the key-currency 
system.  The natural reference for this gradual approach is European monetary unification.   
Before unification, the European Currency Unit (ECU)  was as much an artificial currency as the 
SDR is today. Actual transactions and assets denominated in ECU represented a small share of 
the market. ECU was no one’s liability. The big change occurred when the ECU became the euro 
issued by a supernational central bank with a clear mandate for price stability. Something similar 
must occur at the world level before SDR can become a true supernational money.  But the 
experience of European monetary unification indicates that the objective of economic 
convergence between member countries is a precondition that at the world level appears  
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economically and politically insurmountable. One world money governed by a world central 
bank is utopian and also difficult to justify in economic terms. A single monetary policy applied 
to vastly heterogeneous countries amplifies divergences between countries with different levels 
of development. There is no other feasible solution to the coexistence between supernational 
money and key-currencies.  
The alternative to a politically unfeasible autonomous superanational central bank is to 
create a cooperative agreement among a restricted group of key countries that find it in their 
interest to share responsibility to stabilize the IMS. Theory and practice suggests that 
cooperation is more likely the smaller the number of and the more homogeneous are the 
participating countries.  
Our proposal to reform the IMS  is based on a cooperative agreement among a restricted 
group of key countries that find it in their interest to stabilize the IMS (Alessandrini and 
Fratianni 2009). The Fed and the ECB, the two most important central banks with an anti-
inflation reputation, could take the initiative by establishing at the IMF a multilateral clearing 
system of debit and credit entries restricted to central banks. The first step would involve the  
Fed and the ECB transferring to the clearing institution earning assets denominated in dollars and 
euros, respectively, against an equivalent amount of supernational bank money  or SBMs. SBMs  
would have the property of a basket currency with the attendant risk diversifying characteristics. 
The mechanics of the SBM would be similar to the SDR with a very critical difference: SBMs, 
unlike SDRs, would be a liability of a supernational institution. Unlike SDRs, SBM would 
become supernational money for central banks. 
The clearing system would be a big step forward from the SDR system in two 
fundamental ways. The first is that SBMs would be created endogenously as a result of actions  
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taken by  participating countries, whereas SDRs are created exogenously as a sort of 
international helicopter money. The second is that the clearing system operates on a banking 
principle. The settlement of credit and debit between central banks would occur through their 
SBM accounts: DC central banks would reduce their stock of SBMs, while SC central banks 
would increase their stock. In addition to redistributing SBMs, the clearing institution could 
create them through an overdraft facility, the size of which would have to be agreed ex-ante by 
the participating countries. DCs could activate their overdraft facility on their SBM accounts and 
become net debtors vis-à-vis the clearing institution. Unlike the SDR scheme, each country 
would have a credit or debit position vis-à-vis the clearing institution; that is, the payment 
structure would be multilateral rather than bilateral. 
The clearing proposal draws from five principles used by Keynes in his plan to reform 
the international monetary system at the end of World War II: gradualism, banking approach, 
complementarity, multilateralism, and symmetry of adjustment (Alessandrini and Fratianni 
2009).
9 The clearing system would solve the impasse that impeded the adoption of the 
Substitution Account in the Seventies. In the clearing system, the IMF does not bear exchange 
rate risk because it does not hold open positions in assets denominated in national currencies. A 
SC central bank exchanges SBMs for dollar reserves by first selling dollar assets in the open 
market and then by converting dollar deposits at the Fed in SBM deposits at the clearing   
institution. The monetary base of the Fed would fully reflect the conversion of SBMs for dollar 
assets. The automatic sterilization permitting the United States to insulate its monetary base from 
the effects of external deficits would disappear. By having to align the monetary base to net 
                                                 
9 The denomination SBM was used by Keynes in the Treatise on Money (1930, p.358): “Its assets should 
consist of gold, securities and advances to central banks, and its liabilities of deposits by central banks. 
Such deposits we will call supernational bank money (or S.B.M for short)”. Excluding gold, our approach 
is the same.  
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foreign payments, the “exorbitant privilege” of the United States as a key-currency country 
would cease. Clearly, the Fed would have to accept such a mechanism.  
The clearing system could not work without explicit rules of the game, such as the size of 
the overdraft facility, the terms of repayment of the overdraft, and who bears the burden of 
external adjustment. In an inflationary environment, it would be up to  DCs  to contract domestic 
spending; consequently, overdraft facilities would have to be contained. In a recessionary 
environment, it would be up to  SCs to raise domestic spending; consequently, overdraft facilities 
would have to be more expansive than in an inflationary environment.   
 
 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
The dollar-based  IMS is fragile. This fragility manifests itself  in large and long-lived 
external deficits of the dominant key-currency country. The United States enjoys the privilege of 
borrowing in the world financial markets at low interest rates without paying a sovereign risk 
premium commensurate with its level of foreign debt. The interest rate “subsidy,” in turn, does 
not give the United States an incentive to make the necessary policy adjustments to align long-
term domestic consumption with long-term domestic output. The end result is that US net 
foreign debt is growing;  with that grows the risk of an implosion of the dollar-based IMS. The 
inherent weakness of the current IMS is that it relies on an international money that is also a 
national money: This dual role cannot be easily reconciled because the Fed faces a conflict 
between pursuing domestic objectives of employment and  inflation  and maintaining the 
international public good of a stable money. This conflict is typically resolved in favor of 
domestic objectives.  
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We have argued that the time to fix the IMS is now for the simple reason that radical 
changes are best made in times of crises. China, the largest creditor country and the most 
exposed to a possible implosion of the dollar-based IMS  has expressed --through the voice of its 
central bank governor,  Zhou Xiaochuan---   the merits of restructuring the IMS around a 
supernational money. However, for practical reasons, China has advocated  the revitalization of 
SDRs. The G20 leaders have obliged. But the SDR scheme is weak. As presently constituted, 
SDRs are neither money nor a claim on an international institution; are issued exogenously 
without any direct  consideration to countries’ financing needs; and can activate international 
monies only through bilateral transactions. As supplements to international reserves, the SDRs 
have failed in the past. 
 Our preferred solution is the creation of a supernational bank money (SBM) within the 
institutional setting of a clearing union. This union goes beyond the simple accounting of 
recording credit and debit entries of  SBMs.  It is the result of a full-fledged agreement  by 
participating central banks on specific rules of the game, such as size and duration of overdrafts, 
designation of countries that would have to bear the burden of external adjustment, and   
coordination of monetary policies. The IMF  is the international organization that is best 
positioned to monitor and “enforce”  these rules; not an easy task, yet feasible. Cooperation, even 
when it is incentive compatible, requires the institutionalization of objectives, ways, and means. 
The interest of the United States in cooperating would be linked to maintaining and improving 
the international brand name of the dollar, which would continue to be used as a means of 
payment and store of value. SBM would be only a substitute (and not a complete replacement) 
for the dollar in official reserves. The interest of China in cooperating would come firstly from  
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the benefits of diversification away from dollar assets and secondly from the larger role the 
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